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In The Original Position Timothy Hinton gathered twelve papers that deal 
with the argument presented by John Rawls in his work on justice in politi-
cal philosophy and ethics. The original position is, for the vast majority of 
political philosophers, a fundamental issue in Rawls’s theory of justice and 
politics. It has been more than four decades since A Theory of Justice (1971) 
was published and philosophers still debate over various concepts that Raw-
ls brought up in his book, especially about the original position and the sub-
concepts it carries. In the preface, Hinton himself states three major reasons 
for the longevity of the original position argument. The reasons are, in order 
of appearance: 1. it captures our intuition that there are morally relevant 
and morally irrelevant considerations in the process of deciding what the 
principles of justice are and gives a fresh way of thinking about objectivity in 
political philosophy; 2. it raises a series of questions that are very important 
for political philosophers; 3. it has triggered the forming of many alternative 
positions in political philosophy. If you think about it, he writes, there prob-
ably hasn’t been a conference concerning political philosophy in which the 
participants didn’t mention Rawls since he published A Theory of Justice. 
So we can probably all agree that there is still the need for publishing books 
that analyse the concept of the original position.
Now that we have that covered, we need to say something about the 
collection of papers that Hinton edited. In The Original Position, twelve 
authors take different approaches to Rawls’s concept by closely examining 
different aspects of the original position, laying out some criticism and de-
fending or further criticising Rawls’s views. It is a very complex subject but 
in this collection of papers authors present Rawls’s arguments in a fairly 
simple manner before continuing with a complex analysis. This enables a 
somewhat unexperienced reader to follow the line of argumentation.
I shall now briefl y introduce every paper from The Original Position 
and give a few comments on each of them, starting with the introduction. 
The introduction (by Hinton himself) gives us a quality insight into Rawls’s 
conception of the original position. I shall give a wider overview of the in-
troduction because it explains the basic components and principles of the 
original position and I won’t repeat the explanations of those concepts when 
they come up (again) in the rest of the book.
After discussing the three reasons for the longevity of the original posi-
tion argument I mentioned above, Hinton gives an overview of the original 
position by examining its position in A Theory of Justice (hereafter: TJ), the 
core of the argument and the changes Rawls made to the original position 
after TJ. The function of the original position in TJ is to stand “between our 
initial basic convictions and the more abstract principles to which inference 
will be made.” The reason for standing in the middle is the fact that Rawls’s 
conception of justice, justice as fairness, relies on our initial beliefs to take 
us to the principles that make up a constitutional democracy and are supe-
rior to utilitarianism. Because of the aforementioned reason Rawls puts the 
original position into a broader conception called “refl ective equilibrium”. 
The role of refl ective equilibrium is to bring into coherence our basic convic-
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tions. The original position does this by excluding biased convictions and 
reasons that we have. That is possible because we are behind the veil of 
ignorance, which means that we know all the general data about human 
life and different conceptions of a good life held by people but we do not 
know any specifi c data about ourselves and our own life. If we take all this 
into account, Rawls famously says we will choose two following principles 
of justice:
The Equal Basic Liberty Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system 
of liberty for others. (TJ, p. 250).
The Second Principle (which comes in two distinct parts, and in which the fi rst 
part has a lexical priority over the second): (a) The Fair Equality of Opportunity 
principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
attached to offi ces and positions open to all citizens under conditions of fair equal-
ity of opportunity; (b) The Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities 
are to be arranged so that they work to the greatest expected benefi t of the least 
advantaged group in society. (TJ, p. 83) [5]
In the part of the introduction which deals with the core of the original posi-
tion argument, Hinton assesses the maximin rule as the basis for deciding 
what kind of society we want, the rule that tells us to chose an alternative 
in which the worst outcome is better than the worst outcome of the other 
alternative. He also states that we use maximin rule under conditions of 
uncertainty, and that the original position gives us those conditions. Fur-
thermore, Hinton analyses the second argument for the original position 
and that is “the strains of commitment”. In that argument Rawls appeals 
to the sense of justice that the parties behind the veil of ignorance have. He 
continues by saying that they will not choose conditions that will prevent 
them from honouring the agreement they reach in living together in a so-
ciety. That also gives stability to the political system. Hinton also writes 
about two important things that relate to the strains of commitment and 
treating people as free and equal. First, he assesses Rawls’s appeal to the 
social bases of self-respect. Second, he appeals to the Kantian principle in 
Rawls’s social contract by which we must not treat people as mere means, 
and that designates that we must share goods by appealing to factors that 
are not arbitrary.
In examining how the original position changed after TJ, Hinton takes 
two focal points. Firstly, he examines how Rawls shifted the focus of his 
theory from fi guring what each of us believes about justice to identifying 
the principles of justice that give the best interpretation of modern liberal 
democracy. Rawls also focused on the reasonable pluralism in democratic 
society, which means that we must examine why people give different an-
swers to important question and still remain reasonable. Secondly, Hinton 
examines Rawls’s shift to describing the original position as a device of rep-
resentation. He states that these shifts in focus help Rawls in solving some 
problems in his theory, most notably to clarify the distinction between the 
reasonable and the rational, and to scale-down the ambitions of his theory.
Hinton concludes the introduction by giving an overview of the articles 
that compose the volume. I will not give an overview of this part because I 
will give my own overview and assessment of the articles.
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The fi rst paper in the collection is written by David O. Brink and it deals 
with the sustainability of justice as fairness as a counter position to classi-
cal utilitarianism (moderate claim) and to mixed conceptions of utilitarian-
ism (ambitious claim). He argues that Rawls has a better chance defending 
his view against traditional utilitarian views and that mixed conceptions 
pose a harder problem to solve, although Rawls can defend the moderate 
claim without defending the ambitious one. In the beginning he assesses 
the concept of justice as fairness itself. He does this by focusing on the two 
basic principles used by Rawls. The fi rst principle is the equal basic liber-
ties principle. The second principle has two parts: the difference principle 
and the fair equality of opportunity principle. The hierarchy of the prin-
ciples is as follows: equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity and 
the difference principle. This is the general conception of justice. Brink then 
establishes Rawls’s hierarchy in the special conception of justice which is 
(for him) settled in this way: 1. equal basic liberties, 2. fair value of ba-
sic liberties, 3. fair equality of opportunity and 4. the difference principle 
[23]. The general conception is applied in societies below a certain material 
well-being threshold, and after we get past the threshold we apply the spe-
cial conception because we aim to increase basic liberties in that situation. 
Brink also presents the extraspecial conception which distributes all the 
components of the special conception according to the difference principle 
which leads to a special conception that is more similar to the general con-
ception. He thinks that this might diminish Rawls’s arguments against the 
mixed conceptions. After that, Brink examines the contractual argument 
for the special conception, while focusing on the diminishing of the mar-
ginal utility and Rawls’s use of the maximin rule. He focuses on the use of 
maximin to counter the use of principle of maximizing utility. Rawls states 
that the decision making behind the veil of ignorance is a process under 
circumstances of uncertainty. Brink states that this leads to two gaps in the 
argument. First, Rawls does not necessarily show that maximin is uniquely 
rational under uncertainty. Second, it is not shown why we have to decide 
under conditions of uncertainty in the original position. It is also stated 
that Rawls gives a harder condition concerning the diminishing of marginal 
utility when he introduces the aforementioned threshold because he insists 
that people don’t care about additional goods after they receive the high-
est minimum. Concerning the unbearable situation that might occur if we 
don’t use the maximin rule, Brink thinks that this prevents any risk taking, 
even a justifi ed one and that it poses a problem for Rawls. After that part 
of the discussion, the author examines the strength of the special concep-
tion against the mixed conceptions. Mixed conceptions accept all of Rawls’s 
principles, except the difference principle. Brink thinks that both mixed 
utilitarianism and suffi citarianism have strong arguments that diminish 
the strength of Rawls’s arguments for the special conception. He concludes 
the article with the claim that even if Rawls isn’t able to show that his form 
of liberalism is superior to other conceptions of liberalism, that should not 
diminish the signifi cance of justice as fairness and that we could reshape 
the argument to create a stronger opposition to mixed conceptions. That 
concludes a very concise and clear overview of Rawls’s efforts to show the 
superiority of his conception. Brink lucidly fi nds gaps in Rawls’s arguments 
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but still isn’t too hasty to just dismiss them, but rather tries to fi nd ways in 
which the argument might be reshaped and that is probably the best part 
of the article.
In the second paper Gerald Gaus and John Thrasher analyse the prob-
lem of rational choice and the original position by examining models of Raw-
ls and Harsanyi. The authors defend The Fundamental Derivation Thesis: 
the justifi cation of a principle of justice J derives from the conclusion that, 
under conditions C, J is the rational choice of chooser(s) P [39]. They state 
that many authors don’t take Rawls’s claim that theory of justice is a part 
of the theory of rational choice. That is the reason for defending the Fun-
damental Derivation Thesis and setting aside question of consent. Gaus 
and Thasher begin with an appeal (and also Rawls’s appeal) to rational 
choice as a common touchstone in a society that has confl icting ideas and 
intuitions about justice. The principles we come to must be identifi ed as 
chosen from moral point of view and from the point of view of actual rational 
individuals, while being recognized as principles of justice. Both conditions 
are essential and give strength to the original position. Authors proceed by 
agreeing with Alexander’s claim of primacy of individual rational choice, 
and the claim that it makes a more important part of Rawls’s argumenta-
tion. They also state that rational choice enables individual choices to have 
an Archimedean point of view in the moral real. The central part of the 
paper is comprised from the analyses of the evolution of Rawls’s original 
position and Harsanyi’s model. In short, the early models of Rawls have the 
rational choice of individuals as their foundation, and do not use the veil 
of ignorance but use a form of the maximin rule. In the examination of the 
middle model, that culminate in A Theory of Justice, authors analyse the 
following changes in Rawls’s theory: “the construction of the information 
sets; (2) the description of the choosers; (3) the more explicit role of maxi-
min as a principle of rational choice: and (4) a switch in the role of maximin 
from primarily an argument for the egalitarian principle, to what seems to 
be the main argument in favour of “the difference principle,” which is itself 
introduced in the middle models.”[46]. The new setting enables the choos-
ers to have an impartial (Archimedean) point of view, and together with the 
introduction of primary goods enables us to choose while using the maxi-
min rule. The fi nal model moves away from rational choice and gives a lot 
more weight to reasonableness. Gaus and Thrasher sum it up by agreeing 
with Gauthier and his claim that Rawls’s models through the years satisfy 
the recognition requirement more than the identifi cation one. In presenting 
Harsanyi’s models, authors show how his models are different from Rawls’s 
models. They present his efforts to show how his setting of the original 
position leads to the choice of average utilitarianism, through the axiom-
atic model and the usage of equiprobability (assigning equal probability to 
every outcome of the rules we accept in the original position) and the use 
of extended preferences (imagining ourselves in the position of other people 
and evaluating the situation from their point of view). Authors proceed to 
explain why it is likely that Harsanyi’s view fails the identifi cation test and 
how it might fail the recognition test. Gaus and Thrasher conclude that the 
Archimedean point of view is alien to most people and that Rawls’s later 
conception, as well as Harsanyi’s conception, use problematic principles of 
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rational choice. They believe that Rawls’s early model has the best chance 
of solving this problem. The authors put focus on relatively neglected role 
of rational choice in Rawls’s theory and their claim that contract theory is 
secondary to rational choice is certainly intriguing. Their analysis of identi-
fi cation and recognition conditions is very useful because it gives us another 
way of examining if the original position theories really generate principles 
of justice for our societies.
The third paper is called “The strains of commitment” and is written 
by Jeremy Waldron. In the paper Waldron argues that the strains of com-
mitment argument is stronger than the arguments for using the maximin 
rule, and that Rawls should put more emphasis on the responsibility of 
people that need to honour the agreement after the veil of ignorance has 
been lifted. He tries to defend the strains of commitment argument against 
two big objections, the malcontents objection and the model-theoretic objec-
tion. The malcontents objection has two parts. Firstly, it states that people 
might reject Rawls’s principles if people refl ect on how much better off they 
would be under alternative principles. Secondly, the objection states that 
some people could reject Rawls’s principles by stating that they would be 
better off if they weren’t living under principles of justice at all. The answer 
to the fi rst objection is that people should be able to live under principles 
of justice, and that they can’t complain if they are not willing to live under 
Rawls’s principles or only have strong preferences against it. The second 
part of the objection has a relatively short answer which states that peo-
ple who are tempted to violate the principles of justice and want to benefi t 
from previous injustice don’t need to be taken into account in determining 
what justice is. The model-theoretic objection says that the strains of com-
mitment argument uses features of application of the principles in society, 
while determining the principles of justice in the hypothetical model. But 
Waldron thinks that the base-model objection can be met by a deeper analy-
sis of the liberal orientation of Rawls’s theory. He does this by appealing to 
pluralism and publicity that guide our search for justice and give it a basic 
grounding in the liberal tradition, and by examining the original position as 
a heuristic device that helps us shape “model conceptions”. He also criticizes 
Ackerman’s attempt to construct an ideal theory with the perfect technol-
ogy thought experiment. Waldron thinks that perfect technology (though 
useful in putting aside question of implementing the principles of justice) 
disregards three important features of liberalism: the state is not only our 
protector but the greatest threat to our rights (if we give it too much power), 
preservation of justice is mostly based on voluntary acts of individuals, and 
we build on those voluntarily acts that enable people to have mutual respect 
and to cooperate. Waldron concludes that we have the best chance of rec-
ognizing the limits of our agreement and capture the spirit of freedom and 
mutual respect if we use the strains of commitment argument. The paper 
itself is fairly simple, because it takes one big argument and two big objec-
tions against it, but that makes it very easy, understandable, and enjoyable 
to read. It is straightforward in giving us the answers to important ques-
tions of commitment to the principles of justice (once we agree upon them). 
In defending the strains of commitment Waldron also (quite successfully) 
defends the contractarian argument put forward by Rawls.
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The fourth paper is written by John Christman, and is entitled “Our 
talents, our histories, ourselves: Nozick on the original position argument.” 
Christmas focuses on Nozick’s arguments against the original position and 
tries to show the reason why his critique fails, while he also tries to fi nd 
some points of convergence between Nozick’s and Rawls’s theory. Author 
begins with a brief overview of Rawls’s theory and the original position, fo-
cusing on the parts Nozick criticizes, especially the difference principle. He 
also gives a basic overview of Nozick’s use of the Lockean proviso of leaving 
“enough and as good” for others while appropriating and exchanging goods 
in a society. From there Christman proceeds to lay out Nozick’s criticism 
of the difference principle and the original position by analysing four lines 
of criticism that overlap. The fi rst line of argumentation is based on shar-
ing the benefi ts of social cooperation, and has two parts (both concerning 
the division of social surplus): considering life outside society for the better 
favoured, and their marginal contribution to the social product. The fi rst 
part is based on picturing the better off as Robinson Crusoes that produce 
on their own island and don’t need to share the product of their labour. This 
is quickly rejected by using Pogges critique of that approach and Rawls’s 
claim that we cannot envision life outside society any more. The second 
part poses a better challenge to Rawls but still (according to Christman) 
fails because although it appeals to calculation of better marginal contribu-
tion by the better off, which is also needed in the usage of the difference 
principle, it fails to capture the need for deriving principles of justice (it still 
doesn’t render the veil of ignorance as useless). The second line of criticism 
is based on bias against historical principles. The argument is based on the 
fact that the original position rules out some theories of justice, including 
Nozick’s entitlement theory. Christman argues that Nozick uses micro ex-
amples to show how this in unfair, while he in fact disregards the purpose 
of the adopting the original position in a process of getting to unbiased in-
stitutions. The third argument is centred in slavery of the talented and the 
priority of liberty, which also relies of micro examples. Nozick states that 
taxation of the talented (who earn more) is like slavery and that it inter-
feres with their liberty. Christman replies that policies which prevent them 
from getting too rich, don’t interfere with their conception of the good and 
their pursuit of their life goals. The last objection is based on the arbitrari-
ness argument, which claims that Rawls also takes into account arbitrary 
factors and that he doesn’t justify deviations from equality. The answer to 
this criticism is in the appeal to the level of institutions, because “Rawls 
does not claim that arbitrary contingencies cannot play a role in how people 
end up in their relative position of social advantage.” [90] Rawls claims that 
we should not take arbitrary contingencies into account when determining 
just institutions. Christman fi nishes the paper by giving general refl ections 
on the original position and Nozick’s entitlement theory, while comparing 
the two. He does this in two parts, fi rst examining different meanings of 
personal entitlements of people and their complexity and then proceeds to 
briefl y analyse justice in the non-ideal world. Christman’s paper gives us a 
clear view of differences between Nozick’s and Rawls’s theories, as well as 
differences in their aims. He does a great job in using TJ to present Rawls’s 
view, because Nozick criticizes that part of Rawls’s work, but still explains 
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how Rawls changed his theory through the years, and how that also affects 
Nozick’s critique of the original position. He also gives clear and simple 
answers to Nozick’s arguments, not only through his own comments and 
secondary literature but also by appealing to Rawls himself.
The fi fth paper, written by Matthew Clayton, deals with similarities and 
differences between hypothetical reasoning in Rawls’s theory and Dworkin’s 
theory. He does this mostly through the analyses of the role of hypothetical 
reason in their accounts of justice (Rawls’s justice as fairness and Dworkin’s 
equality of resources). Clayton begins with Dworkin’s assessment of the 
original position, and supports the claim that although Dworkin states that 
a hypothetical contract isn’t as binding as a real contract, he does not reject 
hypothetical reasoning as a whole but rather states that it is grounded in 
some deeper principle (for him that is right to equal concern and respect). 
Rawls’s reply is that the original position is situated in a larger framework 
and its successful integration within a conception of justice, and he rejects 
the grounding Dworkin proposes. Clayton continues by briefl y analysing 
Dworkin’s concept of using thought experiments that do not involve hypo-
thetical reasoning, an auction of resources and its envy test (which insures 
that no one wants the set of resources of anybody else in the end), which 
he combines with the hypothetical insurance theme. That includes putting 
individuals behind a “thin” veil of ignorance in which the people have more 
information than in Rawls’s but still don’t know what their chances are of 
being the one that lacks internal resources. Two objections that also arise 
are concerned with the difference principle, which according to Dworkin 
fails to respond to morally relevant differences between individuals and the 
original position that uses a veil of ignorance that is too thick and that it 
affects the fairness of a society. The question of excluding their conceptions 
of the good is problematic for Dworkin, but also for other authors (Clayton 
uses Nagel’s objection), but Rawls tells us that under conditions of reason-
able plurality and by virtue of “comprehensive doctrines” that exist, advanc-
ing our good might not advance the good of everyone (which is exactly what 
he wants to achieve). The line of argumentation that occupies Clayton in 
the remaining part of the text is Dworkin’s effort of creating a connection 
between justice and an individual’s values. He focuses on Dworkin’s use 
of the envy test to show the value of using a thin veil of ignorance. The 
envy test enables us to compare ourselves with others, but we can be en-
titled to compensation only if we can’t satisfy out life goals. In short, if we 
don’t feel envy towards others, than we are equal. This is used to critique 
Rawls’s approach that uses primary goods, and does not take into account 
that some people don’t value primary goods as much. Clayton also explains 
Dworkin’s ex ante envy test of insurance buying argument, and the hypo-
thetical insurance market that eliminates information that can produce an 
unfair outcome. All this also gives “an account of equality that is respon-
sive to people’s ambitions for their lives”. This is used to compare the thin 
and thick veil of ignorance, and during the comparison Clayton states that 
Dworkin’s conception may be superior for comparing people’s lives and that 
it makes principles of justice more acceptable to people. Clayton actually 
gives an excellent overview of challenges that Dworkin’s view of liberal-
ism poses to Rawls. Maybe the biggest factor is that Dworkin also wants 
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to achieve a society which is based on equality and liberalism, but (maybe) 
gives a better account of how people should compare themselves to others 
while using Rawls’s own device, the veil of ignorance (which he modifi es). 
Clayton captures that fact very clearly and understandably.
The sixth paper “Feminist receptions of the original position” is written 
by Amy R. Baehr, and in it Baehr evaluates the original position through 
feminist considered convictions while trying to see if we can have a plau-
sible account of feminism that is also contractarian. She starts by giving ten 
feminist considered convictions about injustice at the level of social institu-
tions and the society itself (or societies), while also introducing the concep-
tion of the gender system that we also fi nd in Rawls’s work. Baehr than 
considers two reasons, brought up by Rawls, the convictions could not be 
met by his theory. First is “ought implies can” related and is based on fi xed 
features of the social world and the second is that the gender system might 
be amended only through measures that are ruled out by the principles of 
justice. She proceeds by taking into account coercive remedies in a well-
ordered society. She analyses Rawls’s account of just and unjust arrange-
ments while examining the possibility of injustice towards women enduring 
in a well-ordered society. Baehr then, taking Rawls’s instructions, tries to 
adjust feminist considered convictions to the principles of justice. Violence 
and discrimination are forbidden by Rawls’s principles, but female primary 
parenting and sexist socialization aren’t necessarily recognized as unjust. 
The possibility (and often sad reality) of women constituting the majority 
of poor people also isn’t counted as unjust because the difference principle 
doesn’t necessarily amend that situation. In short, the original position does 
not recognize some feminist considered convictions as unjust, and also pre-
vents effective remedies towards others. Baehr also states that Rawls might 
propose reconciliation with most of the gender system. After that she gives 
two feminist proposals to modify original position. The fi rst one is based on 
extending the scope of application of Rawls’s principles, a proposition Baehr 
mostly bases on Susan Okin’s feminist full basic structure view. The sec-
ond proposal is based on an attempt to situate considered conviction about 
dependency into the initial situation by proposing the addition of not fully 
cooperating individuals to the situation. In the end, Baehr proposes that we 
take Rawls’s instruction and continue the process of refl ective equilibrium. 
The paper gives an interesting perspective of possibilities of forming liberal 
conception of feminism through Rawls’s theory. While examining feminist 
considered conceptions and their status in a well-order society Baehr shows 
that Rawls’s theory has problems in accommodating the demand that femi-
nism poses.
David Estlund is the author of the seventh paper, which is entitled “G.A. 
Cohen’s critique of the original position”. In the paper, Estlund presents 
Cohen’s critique trough three lines of argumentation: “fact dependent foun-
dations”, “justice as regulation”, and the claim that the original position 
gives to morally bad fact. He fi rst present Cohen’s relative and ultimate 
claim of fact-independence. The relative claim tells us that principles are 
grounded in deeper principles that depend on different facts, while the ul-
timate claim tells us that those principles are grounded in a principle that 
does not depend on facts. That forms a base for analysing Cohen’s objec-
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tion which is based on unearthing (Estlund names the concept) the deeper 
principles. Estlund fi rst examines the formal objection, which states that 
Rawls’s principles of justice in fact lie on deeper principles and considers a 
possible counter argument that may be found in Rawls’s theory. He contin-
ues by analysing the substantive objection, which critiques Rawls’s original 
position as a method that is made for choosing rules of social regulation and 
not for choosing the principles of justice. Estlund says that the two objec-
tions differ in the points of their critique: the formal objection is based on 
the facts and the substantive one is based on the notion of regulation. He 
states that the strong distinction between rules of regulation and principles 
of justice gives strength to Cohen’s critique, especially if we closely examine 
it apart from the formal objection. After briefl y appealing to Nozick’s and 
Cohen’s objections that Rawls is question begging in the process of deriv-
ing the principles of justice, Estlund moves to Cohen’s critique that states 
that the original position incorporates values that have nothing to do with 
justice. Although he thinks that this objection is far more problematic for 
Rawls’s theory, Estlund states that this objection relies on the problem of 
social policy. That is why he examines Cohen’s objection based on tax brack-
ets and exactness and differential care, arguing that Rawls’s theory can be 
successfully defended from both objections. He concludes by presenting the 
third line of critique, the one about constructivism being sensitive to mor-
ally bad facts, while stating that although it is not an elaborated objection 
it still poses a serious challenge to the original position. The paper gives us 
an overview of one of the most elaborated critiques of the original position, 
which has grown during time. Estlund presents Cohen’s view in a simple 
and understandable manner, just as he announces in his introduction. He 
gives answers to the critiques by showing how Rawls’s view can be modifi ed 
to accommodate the objections, while also showing how some objections fail 
because they are inconsistent and question begging. Still he manages to 
show us that we must take those objections seriously by pointing to some 
weak spots in the original position.
Timothy Hinton himself wrote the eighth paper in the collection he ed-
ited, entitled “Liberals, radicals, and the original position”. Hinton aims to 
show how social theory shapes Rawls’s liberal conception and his principles 
of justice, while also showing how radicals should contest his view. He be-
gins with a brief overview of Rawls’s concepts that are important for discus-
sion with the radicals (two moral powers, veil of ignorance, self-respect), 
while showing that Rawls’s work is dominated by a form of liberal legal-
ism and primacy of the liberal freedoms. After that Hinton tries to show 
that Rawls chooses the parties in the original position to have an ideal-
historical approach and work within the thin social theory, without using 
real history and rich normative or evaluative language. That, according to 
Hinton, opens Rawls to criticism from radicals. Then he presents an op-
posite view by presenting a simplifi ed version of racial capitalism, and its 
factual part about the emergence of white domination with the development 
of capitalism, as well as its explanatory part which focuses on conventions 
that whites put in place for the purpose of racially dividing the world in 
order to dominate the blacks. This theory is explained and then put into the 
original position framework. Hinton does this to create an argument which 
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contrasts telic autonomy and individual sovereignty, and also contrasts 
liberal-democratic specifi cation of the equal basic liberties principle with 
the radical-democratic specifi cation. He argues that if we enable parties 
in the original position access to real history they would choose the radical 
specifi cation, because they want to preserve their self-respect (and would do 
that more effectively) and because racial domination would prevent a large 
part of a society to develop telic autonomy (they would have a good position 
to form their own system of ends). Hinton also briefl y discuses problems 
that arise while Rawls uses thin-ideal social theory to get to the second 
principle of justice. He fi nishes the paper with three objections to his argu-
ment: the appeal to the Ockham’s razor in favour of Rawls’s theory, the fact 
that Rawls presents fourstages of implementing the principles of justice to 
laws and the claim that Hinton mixes them up and the ideal theory objec-
tion that states that Rawls focuses on the ideal and Hinton on the non-ideal 
cases. Hinton thinks that all these objections can be met as he puts forward 
his replies. The paper as a whole provides strong basis for arguing that 
Rawls does not produce principles that can effectively preserve our moral 
powers in a non-ideal circumstances, mostly because it does not appeal to 
real historical facts and thick social theory. Hinton manages to capture this 
problem while also giving a viable alternative using the radical view in the 
original position framework and shows how that other kind of forming the 
principles of justice can be more effective.
The ninth chapter is: “The original position and Scanlon’s contractu-
alism” written by Joshua Cohen. His aim is to present Rawls’s Rational 
Advantage Model (his name for the concept) that is used in the original 
position while analysing the original position as a device of representation. 
He also compares Rawls’s approach with Scanlon’s approach through the 
usage of judgemental (Rawls) and substantive (Scanlon) individualism. 
Cohen starts by examining how the original position serves as a device of 
representation. He does this by analysing how usage of the veil of ignorance 
constrains our rational choice in the original position and how that ratio-
nal choice promotes one’s advantage is a society of free and equal persons 
who cooperate. The question is why use the Rational Advantage Model and 
the veil of ignorance. That is why Cohen proceeds to give a more detailed 
examination of the usage of the veil of ignorance. He tries to show that 
Rawls doesn’t give suffi cient reason for employing the thick veil of igno-
rance, and also tries to show that the ethical interpretation of the initial 
situation preserves the judgemental individualism in a contract view. He 
puts substantive individualism in contrast with Rawls’s view, stating that 
his view satisfi es only one version of substantive individualism, and that 
Scanlon’s version (the Reasonable Objection view) raises a problem for the 
Rational Advantage Model. Cohen moves on to another objection of the Ra-
tional Advantage Model, which argues that the usage of the original posi-
tion makes us use additional steps in the argumentation because we need 
to put in additional facts to the process (Cohen presents them as Further 
Facts). This raises the cost of using the original position. Cohen illustrates 
this by showing that the argument from self-respect can be deduced more 
directly without the use of the original position. Cohen fi nishes with the 
analysis of Scanlon’s Reasonable Complaint Model and compares it with 
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the Public Reason Model, which is a part of Rawls’s ethical interpretation. 
He argues that advantages that we can get by using both the Reasonable 
Complaint Model and the Rational Advantage Model are too costly or il-
lusory, while arguing that the Public Reason Model represents normative 
political arguments in the best way. Cohen manages to present how the use 
of rational choice model in the device of representation carries problems 
that can be seen by closely examining how it works. The biggest problem 
is that it does not allow us to directly use our reasons for introducing our 
complaints or arguing for more equality in our society. He also shows that 
Scanlon’s model doesn’t solve those problems, because it mostly shifts focus 
from the rational to the reasonable while blocking some other useful fea-
tures of Rawls’s model.
In the tenth paper Andrews Reath explores “The ‘Kantian roots’ of the 
original position”. Reath analyses the links between Kant’s moral concep-
tion and Rawls’s theory, while analysing similar concepts and the inspira-
tion Rawls found in Kant’s work. He starts by analysing Kant’s concept of 
moral autonomy that is necessary to show how it forms the root of the origi-
nal position. Reath gives an overview of the Formula of Universal Law, the 
Formula of Humanity, and shows how they pair up with the principle of au-
tonomy in order to make the categorical imperative necessary and publicly 
acceptable. That autonomy gives us a part in the making of the universal 
law and gives us the basis of dignity which enables us to follow the Formula 
of Humanity. The analysis of Kant’s moral constructivism shows that Kant 
also idealizes persons with specifi c rational and moral capacities and Reath 
uses Rawls’s analysis of Kant’s usage of the rational and the reasonable in 
order to show connections between their constructivisms. He also examines 
Kant’s conception of a person which is the centre part of his conception, and 
examines three basic notions of Rawls (well-ordered society, the idea of the 
person, and the original position). Reath then analyses the Kantian roots of 
the original position, mostly through the analysis of the person as free and 
equal, while putting it in comparison with Kant’s notion of autonomy. He 
also points to “parallels between Rawls’s original position as a procedure 
of construction and Kant’s CI-procedure” [215] and how justice as fairness 
contains different forms of autonomy that Kant stipulates. Reath gives an 
overview of Rawls’s fi rst appeal to Kantian interpretations and concepts 
in the 40th chapter of TJ and how he elaborated the use of Kant’s theory 
in the “Kantian Constructivism”. He concludes the paper by pointing to 
some other parallels between Rawls’s theory and Kant, namely the way in 
which “the reasonable frames the rational”, and the similar way in which 
the original position and Kant’s conception lead to substantive normative 
principles. Reath ends the paper with a possible difference between Rawls’s 
theory and Kant’s conception, which arises from different bases on which 
they build their conceptions of persons. Reath provides us with an insight-
ful analysis of Kantian roots of the original position, while also giving an 
overview of Rawls’s interpretation of Kant’s moral theory. This is very use-
ful in examining the setup of the original position and Rawls’s motivation 
for using the constructivist approach in his theory. Reath also shows us how 
all the concepts that Rawls uses result in the two principles of justice he 
advocates and how that correlates to Kant’s effort of establishing universal 
moral rules through categorical imperatives.
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Paul Weithman is the author of “Stability and the original position from 
the Theory to Political Liberalism”, the eleventh paper in the collection. 
He argues that the idea of self-stabilization of the principles of justice and 
the “self-enforcing argument” can provide answers to important questions 
concerning Rawls’s theory. Weithman fi rst gives a brief view of the original 
position as a device of representation, because he later argues that it is an 
integral part of the self-enforcing. After that he lays out the three conditions 
of self-enforcement on the basis of theory of non-cooperative games (games 
that do not have a mechanism of coercion), and proceeds to apply them to 
agreement on Rawls’s principles of justice. That leads us to three conditions 
being modifi ed for Rawls’s theory to be self-enforcing agreement: “(R1) The 
principles of justice that members of the well ordered society are to follow 
must be specifi ed by terms of an agreement or contract among them...”, (R2’) 
None of the members of the well-ordered society can have suffi cient reason 
to deviate from principles of justice, at least so long as all the others com-
ply with them, and all do comply...”, and (R3’) The fact that the principles 
would be agreed to in the contract referred to in (R1) must be what brings it 
about that members of the well-ordered society comply with them, as (R2’) 
requires, and the connection between the hypothetical agreement and the 
conduct referred to by (R2’) must itself be established in ways which treat 
members of the well-ordered society...”. Each condition ends with the same 
citation from TJ (p. 19) “as moral persons, as creatures having a concep-
tion of their good and capable of a sense of justice”. Weithman tells us that 
satisfying conditions (R1), (R2’) and (R3’) would be, as he calls it, “Rawlsian 
self-enforcing”. He proceeds to argue that the original position satisfi es the 
conditions (R1), (R2’) and (R3’). The biggest challenge is to show how the 
hypothetical agreement could cause compliance, and Weithman does that 
by arguing in favour of educating citizens through institutions by appeal-
ing to the publicity condition and the four-stage sequence. Having satis-
fi ed conditions of Rawlsian self-enforcing, justice as fairness becomes stable 
through self-stabilization (because the citizens themselves maintain justice 
of the basic institutions). After examining the self-enforcing, Weithman pro-
ceeds to present and analyse Rawls’s turn to political liberalism. In short, 
Rawls found inconsistencies in the TJ, and dealt with them by changing the 
basis of justice as fairness for the moral personality to political personal-
ity or citizenship (the shift is from the equal and free persons to citizens). 
Weitham examines the changes this makes to conditions of Rawlsian self-
enforcing by presenting their political variants. By doing that he also ex-
plains how Rawls changed his view and some part of the argumentation to 
accommodate for the changes he made (for example the idea of an overlap-
ping consensus which is an integral for arguing that political liberalism still 
accommodates the conditions of self-enforcing). Weitham concludes with ex-
amining the necessity of the original position. He argues that the original 
position is essential for providing stability and self-enforcement in the later 
stages, which makes it crucial for justice as fairness. Weithman manages 
to shed light on Rawls’s shift from TJ to Political Liberalism, while also 
providing additional arguments that strengthen the stability of the concep-
tion of justice Rawls advocates. He manages to do that by closely analysing 
the concept of self-enforcement, while showing how Rawls’s theory is self-
enforcing in both forms.
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In the last paper Gillian Brock gives an overview of the original position 
in The Laws of Peoples (also the title of the paper). Brock’s aim is “high-
lighting the role played by the original position in arriving at guidance in 
international affairs.” [247] She starts by briefl y introducing the concept 
of the original position in TJ and then moves on to outline Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples and its eight principles. There are three parts of further examina-
tion and they follow Rawls’s applications of the original position in order 
to get to the Law of Peoples. The first one is applied to liberal people in 
determining their basic structures (internally) and the second one is ap-
plied during the process of agreement between representatives of liberal 
peoples (internationally). At the international level, the parties would come 
to agree, according to Rawls, on eight principles and three international 
organizations (concerning fair trade, concerning banking, and one similar 
to the United Nations). He applies the original position to the agreement 
between “decent peoples” (peoples that are not liberal but satisfy four 
condi-tions Rawls specifi es for them to be dubbed as decent), while 
arguing that they will come to the same conclusions as the liberal peoples 
(also describ-ing a hypothetical decent people Kazanistan). Liberal and 
decent peoples form a society of well-ordered peoples, based on mutual 
respect, but Rawls still does not think that his principles of justice should 
be applied globally. After presenting the shortly described outline, Brock 
turns to critical re-sponses to the Law of Peoples, and they are: Pogge’s 
objection concerning the international borrowing privilege and 
international resource privilege that benefi t wealthy and powerful states, 
Rawls’s notion of separateness which is opposed by globalization and 
integration, Rawls’s unclear notion of a people, Rawls’s exclusion of 
greater economic inequalities in the world and notion of human rights in 
the decent states. All this amounts to critics saying that Rawls’s theory 
isn’t realistic enough and is not utopian enough, although Rawls claimed 
that his Law of Peoples makes a realistic utopia. Brock proceeds to defend 
the Law of Peoples by appealing to Freeman’s re-sponse that the Law of 
Peoples tries to shape foreign policies of the liberal peoples. Decent peoples 
serve as a theoretical construct that enables us to see with which peoples 
should liberal peoples cooperate with, and how to establish peaceful and 
stable world order. She proceeds to present counter-arguments, while 
claiming that Rawls endorses an incomplete list of human rights. Brock 
ends with arguments against claims that Rawls has an inad-equate 
approach to addressing global poverty and that he tolerates non-liberal 
societies in a problematic way. First counter argument is a fairly simple 
one: Rawls thinks that giving resources to the poor is not enough. We 
should aim to reform their institutions in order to give them opportunities 
of effectively using resources. The second counter argument, in short, tells 
us that there might be other conceivable ways of developing, ways that 
don’t include liberal society. Brock manages to tackle serious objection to 
the Law of Peoples by turning our attention to a more realistic goal of 
peace and stability, the goal that is also a condition for global justice. She 
manages to defend Rawls’s claims about global poverty and human rights 
by showing us that he gives us more solutions that it may seem at fi rst.
The Original Position represents a valuable contribution to critical ex-
amination of a theory of justice put forward by John Rawls. It gives us a 
clear and simple overview of Rawls’s concepts by examining their sustain-
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ability, through different examinations of critiques, roots and different ap-
plication of Rawls’s central concept, the concept of the original position. The 
book is suitable for people (in my opinion, especially students) who want to 
learn more about the foundations of the contemporary political philosophy 
but also for advanced readers and professors who want to tackle serious 
problems that are discussed in the collection. Hinton managed to collect 
papers that give a great overview because they cover a multitude of ap-
proaches to the original position.
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Imagination has become a fashionable topic, and its role in procuring knowl-
edge has become a central challenge in the analytical debate on imagination 
(see, for instance, the 2006 issue of Metaphilosophy under the same title as 
the present collection, Knowledge through imagination). The present collec-
tion offers a well-organized range of interesting and challenging contribu-
tions. They are divided into three groups, the fi rst encompassing taxonomi-
cal and architectural issues (featuring papers by M. Balcerak Jackson, P. 
Langland-Hassan and N. Van Leeuwen), and the second offering “optimistic 
approaches” (T. Williamson, J. Jenkins Ichikawa, the co-editor A. Kind her-
self, and J. Church). The optimism is balanced in the third part, featuring 
“skeptical approaches” by H. Maibom, Sh. Spaulding and by the co-editor P. 
Kung. I shall choose a paper or two from each group, with apologies to the 
rest of the authors. (For quotations, I put page numbers in brackets.)
Let me start with the “Introduction” by the editors. They note that “the 
puzzle of imaginative use concerns two distinct and seemingly incompatible 
uses to which imagination is often put. (1) Sometimes it is an escape from 
reality, and sometimes it is “used to enable us to learn about the world as it 
is, as when we plan or make decisions or make predictions about the future. 
But how can the same mental activity that allows us to fl y completely free 
of reality also teach us something about it?” (Ibid.) How is the “instruc-
tive use” of imagination possible? The editors optimistically hope that a 
closer analysis will explain the joint possibility of the two uses, in particular 
the instructive one, and see the key to the explanation in constraints that 
thinkers-imaginers put upon their activity. The constraints come in two 
kinds. First, they “may be architectural; that is, they may result from our 
cognitive psychological architecture.” (22) Second, the constraints may de-
rive from more spontaneous sources, such as limitations that we voluntarily 
impose upon our imaginative projects (Ibid).
Amy Kind develops these ideas further in her paper “Imagining Un-
der Constraints”. She offers a characterization of imagining that involves 
a more active effort of mind than does supposition or entertaining a prop-
osition (148), and quotes Kendall L. Walton’s (1990) classic Mimesis as 
Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts (Harvard 
